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WILLIAM M. FLEMING & G. EMLEN HALL*

Water Conservation Incentives for
New Mexico: Policy and Legislative
Alternatives
ABSTRACT
A broadrange of optionsfor encouragingmunicipal, industrialand
agriculturalwater conservationare proposedfor water-shortNew
Mexico. Of particular interest are feasible options within the
existing institutionaland legalframeworkfocusing on measures
that could be implemented without statutory changes by the Office
of the State Engineer and the Interstate Stream Commission.
Definitions of water conservation and beneficial use should be
adopted, with emphasis on efficiency and economicfeasibility. A
"water conservation policy handbook" should be developed, with
guidelines for preparingconservation plans and information on
available conservationgrants and water banking opportunities.
Additional funding for water conservation activities should be
pursued through the establishment of a "water conservation
grants" program, following examples in Colorado, Texas, and
Arizona. Projects currently funded by the Interstate Stream
Commission should document the amount of water conserved.
Return flow policies should encourage groundwater reuse and
recharge, should account for lower quality water in assigning
credits, and should recognize that a water right includes a
diversion amount,farm delivery amount, a consumptive irrigation
requirement,a returnflow amount, conveyance losses, and on-farm
incidental depletions. A policy statement should be prepared
stating that conserved or banked water depletions can be sold or
leased by acequia associations, conservation districts or
municipalities. Policy statements need to be prepared and
publicized that recognize the conservationadvantagesof protecting
waterfrom quality degradationand the potentialfor using and
reusing poor quality water for appropriate uses. In cooperation
with the Environment Department,a system of water creditsfor
using poor quality water and other reuse procedures should be
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established.A system of withdrawalfees should be adopted to pay
for administering the water conservationprogram, which would
include water conservationgrants. Methodologiesfor calculating
the economic benefits of water conservationshould be included in
a "water conservation handbook," and an economist should be
hired to analyze potential projects. All water right applicants
should be requiredto preparea conservationplan, with guidelines
for preparationpublished in a "water conservation handbook."
Metering should be mandatory. The Office of the State Engineer
should recognize in a policy statement that integrated resource
management plans for watersheds provide rational bases for
statewide water planning.
INTRODUCTION
New Mexico's water law has neither a definition of water
conservation nor a set of coherent policies for the conservation of water.
This analysis reviews a range of options for encouraging municipal,
industrial, and agricultural water conservation, particularly those feasible
within the existing institutional and legal framework; and chooses the most
promising for detailed evaluation. The work focuses on measures that
could be implemented through the Office of the State Engineer (OSE) and
Interstate Stream Commission (ISC), but are not limited to these agencies,
especially where cooperation with other entities would be beneficial.
Practical approaches are suggested for new conservation statutes,
regulations, and policies.
WATER CONSERVATION STATUTES IN NEW MEXICO
Prior Appropriation Doctrine and Beneficial Use
New Mexico follows the "Colorado doctrine"' of prior appropriation, in which the "first in time equals first in right." 2 Under this system,
the law requires that in times of shortage the first appropriator receive as
much water as is available up to a full supply before junior right holders.3
Article XVI of the New Mexico Constitution provides that

1. See IRA G. CLARY, WATER IN NEW MEXIco: A HISTORY OF 1TS MANAGEMENT AND USE
39-43(1987).
2. See id. at 42-43.

3. See id.
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All existing rights to the use of any waters in this state for
any useful or beneficial purposes are hereby recognized and
confirmed.4
The unappropriated water of every natural stream, perennial
or torrential, within the state of New Mexico, is hereby
declared to belong to the public subject to appropriation for
beneficial use, in accordance with the laws of the state.
Priority of appropriation shall be given the better right.5
Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of
the right to the use of the water.6
The prior appropriation doctrine has not always encouraged water
to be used in ways that would promote conservation and efficient use.
Wilkinson describes western states, including New Mexico, as "motivated
by the 'use it or lose it' mentality that has always driven western water
developers to extract as much water as possible as quickly as possible lest
it be appropriated by someone else."7 However, he sees opportunities to
work within the structure of the doctrine, opining that "[sietting water
policy right in a relatively short time is a realistic objective, and it can be
done without taking draconian measures."8 In terms of water policy reform
in the West, Wilkinson recommends that "[f]irst and foremost, states
should adopt phased-in conservation programs to require reduced
consumption and diversion of water. Over time, the current high level of
waste can be significantly reduced through installing affordable and
available technology
that would permit more efficient use of the water
9
resources."
The concept of "beneficial use," although undefined in the New
Mexico constitution, is an evolving concept." Agreeing that water is a
property right, but limited to beneficial use, Wilkinson states that "[wlater
users do plainly possess vested property rights, but they are limited to
beneficial use-that is, efficient use without unreasonable waste. This
means that states can squeeze current usage to reduce inefficient
practices."" Other authors, including Clyde, agree that the prior appropria-

4.

N.M. CoNsT. art XVI, § 1.

5. N.M. CoNSr. art. XVI, § 2.
6. N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 3.
7. CHARLS F. WnIINSON, CRONTHE NEXt MERIAN: LAND, WATER ANDTHE FUTnE
oF THE WEST 223 (1992).
8. Id. at 286.

9. Id.at 288.
10.
11.

Seeid. at290.
id. at 289.
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tion doctrine is adaptable to change and can be used to provide incentives
for water conservation. 2
Nonetheless, there are several aspects of New Mexico's law that
could create impediments in adapting to modem concepts of beneficial use
and conservation. The first possible impediment is that the vast majority of
rights confirmed in Section 1 of the state constitution were pre-1907 rights,
which constituted most of the surface water rights in New Mexico.13 Many
of these rights have never been formally defined in adjudication suits and
are therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of the State Engineer. As a
result, these pre-1907 surface water rights may lie beyond the power of the
State Engineer to promote conservation by defining beneficial use.
The second issue is that "[piriority of application shall be given the
better right" only describes the strength of the right relative to other
holders. Senior appropriators, who normally control the largest allocations, have little incentive to conserve."5 Prior appropriation legally protects
their rights so long as they are putting their duty to full use. Prior
appropriation does not mandate efficient beneficial use, onlyfull beneficial
use.16 A conservation approach, using Wilkinson's interpretation of
beneficial use, would encourage all users, especially senior users, to
conserve water. 7 Once a water right has been confirmed or permitted, the
OSE normally does not have the authority to lower a duty unless there is
an application for a transfer. 8 The office could take a forfeiture action, but
that would only determine whether the person was using the full right, not
whether the right was being efficiently used.
Thirdly, New Mexico law states that "[b]eneficial use shall be the
basis, the measure and the limit of the right to the use of water." 9 Under
New Mexico's prior appropriation law, beneficial use as the basis of a
water right has not been defined. One way to incorporate the concept of
conservation into a system that doesn't account for efficiency would be to
define the measure and limit of beneficial use with a conservation
addendum. For example, an administrative definition (e.g., OSE regulation)

12. See Steven E. Clyde, Adapting to the Changing DemandfirWater Use Through Continued
Rement of the PrirAppropriationDoctrine: An Alternative Approach to Wholesale Reallocation,
29 NAT. RESOURCES J.435,454 (1989).
13. N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 1.
14. See WILKINSON, supranote 7, at 234.

15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See Bill Fleming &Emlen Hall, Analysis of Potential Water Conservation Incentives
for New Mexico 5 (May 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the New Mexico Office
of the State Engineer).
19. N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 3.
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could say that "beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit
of the right to the use of water, subject to the appropriator making
reasonably efficient use of his water as defined by the state engineer." This
type of regulation could be adopted by the OSE without requiring
amendment to the constitution.
New Mexico Return Flow Policies
Water right policies in New Mexico are designed to protect
downstream and other water right holders." When water is returned to a
river or aquifer after certain uses, the amount of return flow is given credit
to the water right holder under New Mexico's water administration
system.21 The policy is based on the principle of "keeping the river whole,"
or not allowing any additional depletions in the river system.' While this
is hydrologically rational and legally equitable, the policy may not
encourage water reuse.
An example of how the policy functions is the disposition of Santa
Fe's sewage outflow after treatment by the municipal waste treatment
facility.' Engineers estimate that municipal use consumes only about 36
percent of the water that is diverted from the several supply sources.' The
remaining 64 percent of the water is returned to the Santa Fe River,'
potentially reducing the amount of diversion rights needed to be acquired
(calculation of the potential reduction is complex because of the different
hydrologic sources of the supply). Because of the high cost of water rights
in the Santa Fe area, there is an incentive to return as much sewage effluent
as possible to the river, rather than to reuse effluent for watering parks and
golf courses.'
The city has not yet applied to the OSE to take advantage of return
flow credits for San Juan-Chama river water.' To fully develop credits for
water diverted from the Rio Grande, the OSE would need to be convinced
that the effluent actually reaches the Rio Grande (it currently is returned to
the Santa Fe River, about ten miles upstream from the Rio Grande).'

20.

See LINDA G. HARRIS, NEW MEXICO WATER RIGHTS 25-26,41 (1984).

21. See id. at 24.
22. See id. at 39.
23. See Harza Eng'g Co. et al., Long-Range Water Planning Study for the Santa Fe Area
(System Expansion Alternatives) M1-13 (Sept. 14,1988) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
Santa Fe County, New Mexico).
24. See id. at M1-13, 111-35 fig.II-1.
25. See id. at IV-20.
26, See id. at MI-13.
27.
28.

See id. at M-13 to 14.
See id. at M1-13, IV-20.
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According to Harza, "the state engineer has suggested that a pipeline from
the Santa Fe wastewater plant to the Rio Grande might be considered."'
From a water rights point of view, there is little incentive for the city to
reuse its effluent. Other factors, such as maintaining a constant flow in the
river downstream from the treatment plant, are important considerations.
Agricultural return flows are often assumed to be a fixed percentage for a wide variety of field conditions, although documentation to
ensure that the percentage is technically accurate and maintained over time
may be lacking. There are no written technical or administrative guidelines
for calculating return flow in the OSE Water Rights Division or Hydrology
Section." Municipal and industrial applicants are required to demonstrate,
either with measurements or technically acceptable calculations, the
amount of water that returns to the hydrologic system."'
An example cited by Chavez is a septic tank application for return
flow credits.3 The present policy is not to allow return flow credits for
septic systems unless the water is demonstrated to return to an aquifer
through metering data or with convincing hydrologic calculations. 3 In this
case, water conservation through on-site reuse of septic tank effluent for
outdoor watering is encouraged by this return flow credit policy.'
The city of Albuquerque receives credit for return flows to the Rio
Grande, which are metered outflows from the sewage treatment plant'3 In
this case, the city may purchase fewer water rights in exchange for the
amount that is returned to the river, thereby reducing the cost of expensive
transfers from other uses.' However, the practice is a disincentive for the
reuse of effluent as groundwater recharge or on parks and golf courses.37
The economic benefits of effluent reuse (e.g. water supply treatment and
other associated savings) have not yet been compared with the costs of
additional water rights purchase.'
A new U.S. Geological Survey groundwater model reports
potentially less connection between the deep aquifer underlying Albuquer-

29. Id. at IV-20.
30. Telephone Interview with Calvin Chavez, Water Resources Engineer, Water Rights
Division, New Mexico Office of the State Engineer(Jan. 10,1996).

31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34.

See id.

35. Telephone Interview with Jean Witherspoon, Deputy Director for Water
Conservation, City ofAlbuquerque (Jan.20,1996).

36. See id.
37. See id.

38. See id.
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que and the Rio Grande than previously considered." If this model were
used instead of the more conservative approaches now used, results would
show that in 1994 more nonrenewable water came from aquifer storage (55
percent) and less (44 percent) from the river when the city's wells were
pumped.' The implications of this new information are that the largely
nonrenewable deeper aquifer is being rapidly depleted and that it may be
prudent to encourage recharge, at least for the portion coming from largely
nonrenewable groundwater storage.41
A policy change that would encourage conservation is one in
which the city has the option to "bank" water without the threat of losing
it through forfeiture.4 The "use it or lose it" criterion of the appropriation
doctrine does not encourage appropriators to use less than a full right,
because after four years they could be vulnerable to forfeiture.' However,
the forfeiture statute exempts municipalities and counties from this
requirement." Therefore, Albuquerque has the opportunity to implement
conservation measures to protect its water sources without fear of losing
water rights.4s
Water Banking in New Mexico
The prior appropriation doctrine doesn't encourage conservation
by water right holders because water saved usually returns to public
ownership. One of the principles of the prior appropriation doctrine is that
a water right cannot be enlarged by a change in use." An irrigator cannot
use water saved by more efficient practices to irrigate additional land. The
reasoning is that there may be additional consumptive use if the area of
irrigated land is increased. Therefore, water saved through conservation
usually cannot be used by the conserver and returns to the public domain.
However, New Mexico recently adopted a statute which allows water to be
"banked" by a conservancy district or an acequia or community ditch
organization without the threat of forfeiture.47

39.

See JOHN MICHAEL KERNODLE ET AL, STIMULATION OF GROUND-WATER FLOW IN THE
MEXIcO, 1901-1994, wrH PROJECIONS TO 2020 1 (U.S.

ALBUQUERQUE BASIN, CENTRAL NEW

Geological Survey Water-Resources Investigations Report No. 94-4251,1995).
40. See id.
41. See Fleming & Hall, supra note 18,at 39.
42. Telephone Interview with Jean Witherspoon, supra note 35.
43. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-28(A) (Michie Repi. Paxnp. 1997).
44. See § 72-5-28(C).
45. Telephone Interview with Jean Witherspoon, supra note 35.
46. See Clyde, supra note 12, at 438.
47. See § 72-5-28(G).
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Periods of nonuse when water rights are acquired and placed
in a state engineer-approved water conservation program, by
a conservancy district.. .[or] an acequia or community ditch
association...shall not be computed as part of the four-year
forfeiture period.'
The Interstate Stream Commission currently banks water to meet commitments in U.S. compacts.49
Pecos Basin Water Rights Lease/Purchase Program
An initiative began in 1988 to alleviate shortages in the Pecos Basin
and to ensure compliance with interstate compact obligations to Texas.'
The state passed legislation in 1991 to create a water conservation program,
including projects proposed by the Interstate Stream Commission,"1 under
which the Commission proposed to lease and purchase water rights in the
Pecos Basin.' The Interstate Stream Commission's long-term goal is to
increase flows at the boundary with Texas by acquiring water rights,
thereby conserving water and protecting water rights in the Pecos Basin.'
The legislation provides a water banking option within the general
forfeiture statute.' The provision exempts water rights owned by acequias,
community ditch associations, or conservancy districts from forfeiture if
these rights are placed in a water conservation program approved by the
state engineer. ' It is important for conservation programs, because it
circumvents one of the primary impediments to conservation in the state's
water code.
To guarantee the actual use of water and thereby avoid speculation, the territorial legislature mandated that an appropriator use as much
water as necessary to fulfill a water right, or duty. ' If a user didn't use a
full duty for extended periods of time, there was a risk of losing part of the
duty.' The general forfeiture statute did not differentiate between non-use
attributable to waste or attributable to conservation by the user. Under this

48. Id.
49. See Fleming &Hall, supra note 18, at 44.
50. See id. at 44.
51. See § 72-5-28(G).
52. See Memorandum from William J.Miller, Interstate Stream Engineer, InterstateStream
Commission, to Eluid L Martinez, State Engineer, New Mexio Office of the State Engineer 1 (Oct.
31,1991) (on file with the New Mexico Office of the State Engineer).
53. See id.
54. See § 72-5-28(G).
55. See id.
56. See § 72-5-28.
57. See id.
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scheme there was a lack of incentive to conserve if the extra saved water
would go back to the state. This new provision gives acequias and conservation districts the incentive to conserve by ensuring that any saved water
will not be subject to forfeiture and can be used for other purposes.
Water Banking Options in Conservancy Districts
One of the major impediments to conservation is the lack of
incentive contained within New Mexico's prior appropriation scheme.
Generally, individual water right holders are always subject to abandonment and forfeiture water statutes.' These statutes do not distinguish
waste from conservation? If an appropriator fails to use a full duty for the
required time period, the right may be subject to forfeiture for the portion
that wasn't used, regardless of the intent of the appropriator? Thus, the
problem confronted by a conscientious appropriator is the fear that, if he
begins to make more efficient use of his duty, there may be a loss of that
saved water. Confronted with this anomaly in New Mexico's statutory
scheme, it is not unreasonable that an appropriator would not invest the
time, effort, and financial resources to enact conservation measures without
receiving some pecuniary benefit. While general water law seems to lack
functional tools to promote conservation goals, the legislature has given
conservancy districts an incentive to conserve.6
As the name indicates, one of the primary purposes for the creation
of conservancy districts was expressly for the conservation and reclamation
of water. 6' To protect and reward the conservancy districts' conservation
of water, the Legislature has specifically exempted conservancy districts
from forfeiture.
Where the district acquires.. .water or water rights, or where
it conserves, develops or reclaims water, it shall have the
rights which go with the appropriation and beneficial use
thereof.. .conservation or reclamation of water by the district
is hereby declared to be an appropriation thereof by the
district, and the disposition thereof under the terms of this
act is hereby declared to be a beneficial use thereof by said
districts and by the lands included therein.?

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See § 72-5-28(G).
See N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 73-14-47(F).

§%73-1-1; 73-1-2

(Michie 1978).
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Irrigation districts do not have the statutory authority to bank water,
leaving them in the position of being potentially vulnerable to water rights
forfeiture after four years of non-use."
Acequia Water Banking
Historically, acequiashave long been the guardian of water rights
for villages throughout New Mexico. Although acequias are similar in
nature to conservancy districts, legally they are different with respect to
forfeiture.' A similarity is that both acequias and conservancy districts have
the power to acquire and hold property and water rights." This important
similarity would give acequias the power to hold excess water that they
conserved, but, as a practical matter, acequiascould conserve water and reapply, or transfer, that water to other parcels of land. The term "conservation" is used in this analysis to mean water use efficiency, rather than the
older meaning of water storage in a reservoir.
Yet, acequias do differ from conservancy districts because they are
not subject to the same rules of forfeiture.67 As discussed above, conservancy districts' water rights are not subject to forfeiture for non-use."
Acequias, on the other hand, are subject to the same forfeiture requirements
as private appropriators: "[t]he rights of an acequia or community ditch
association to the waters of the acequia or their use on the lands and
property owned by the acequia or association shall not be lost by the acequia
or community ditch association by prescription or adverse possession or
for nonuse of waters except as provided in Section 72-5-28 NMSA 1978. "0
Although the language of the statute purports to exempt acequias
from the loss of water rights due to non-use, it is not an exemption at all.
Section 72-5-28, the general forfeiture statute, applies to acequias7
Therefore, just as with private appropriators, there is little incentive to
implement a conservation plan if the water remains at risk. The system of
water rights for acequias would hold some promise for conservation. There
may be an incentive to conserve so long as the conserved water is placed
into use. This would result in higher efficiency, but as a practical matter
wouldn't affect overall use of water. Perhaps more crops would be grown

64. Telephone Interview with Patrick Simpson, Assistant Attorney General, Legal
Division, New Mexico Office of the State Engineer (Dec. 2,1995).
65. See § 73-2-22.1(B).
66. See §§ 73-14-47(B) & (F).
67. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-28 (Michie Repl. Pamp. 1997).
68. City of Raton v. Vermejo Conservancy Dist., 678 P.2d 1170, 1175 (N.M. Ct. App.
1984).
69. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 73-2-22.1(B) (Michie 1978).
70. § 72-5-28.
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and less water wasted, but just as much or more water would be used or
it would be lost due to forfeiture.
The most promising avenue for acequias is the water banking
statute, which allows water banking of conserved water for future
growth.71 Adopted for the Pecos River Water Conservation Program, the
provision allows for water banking in any part of the state.7 Presumably,
the water would have to be used within the specific conservancy district or
acequia association where the conservation takes place.' While conserved
water in a bank does not have to return to the public domain, it is
Simpson's opinion that "it does not allow for sale of banked water and
leaves open the question of whether the water is wasted."74 If the water
comes under the classification of "wasted water," it returns to the public
domain for use by subsequent appropriators. 5
Another view is expressed by Richardson, who suggests that water
conserved under Section 72-5-28(G) could be leased or sold to other water
users.76 Similar to the ISC's Pecos River Water Conservation Program,
Richardson suggests a conservation program with both a forfeiture
protection and a water bank function." For the OSE to allow the lease or
sale of conserved water, there would have to be convincing evidence
presented by the applicant that the action would not result in an increase
in depletions exceeding the conserved amount.78
Assurance that banked water rights could be sold would be a
positive incentive for water conservation. Two options for resolving the
issue are proposed by Simpson, who suggests that there is justification for
either interpretation of the statute. One option encouraging conservation
would be for the OSE to issue an interpretive policy statement indicating
that the office agrees that, under the present legislation, banked water
could be sold.8° A second and more complicated option would be to draft
additional statutory language making it clear that banked water could be
sold, and to submit this to the Legislature for consideration.81 A reasonable
interpretation could be made by the OSE that banked water is saleable
71. See § 72-5-28 (G); Telephone Interview with Patrick Simpson, supra note 64.
72. Telephone Interview with Patrick Simpson, supranote 64.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. Telephone Interview with Bruce Richardson, Water Resources Specialist, Hydrographic Survey Division, New Mexico Office of the State Engineer (Jan. 14,2000).
77. See id.

78. See id.
79. Telephone Interview with Patrick Simpson, Assistant Attorney General, Legal
Division, New Mexico Office of the State Engineer(Nov. 2,1995).
80. See id.
81. See id.
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under existing legislation, and a policy statement to this effect would
clarify the issue and serve as an incentive for water conservation.
Implementing the Promising Approaches
The following incentives are identified as promising and are
discussed in terms of potential changes in statutes, regulations and policies,
as well as strategies for implementation:
definitions of conservation, beneficial use and public welfare;
grants and loans;
return flow policies;
water banking and forfeiture issues;
coordination of water quality and quantity;
user charges;

economic analysis;
integrated resource management and conservation plans; and
disposition of conserved water.
DEFINITIONS OF CONSERVATION, BENEFICIAL USE AND
PUBLIC WELFARE
Beneficial Use as Related to Conservation
"Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of the
right to the use of water."' Under New Mexico's prior appropriation law,
"beneficial use" remains undefined. Beneficial use, in its usual meaning, is
a very broad standard and there are many types of uses that are beneficial.
An effective way to incorporate the concept of conservation into a system
that doesn't explicitly account for efficiency would be to define beneficial
use with a conservation addendum.
Analysis of the term "beneficial use" may be helpful. There are
three distinct concepts defined by the phrase "beneficial use." The first is
that "beneficial use shall be the basis.. .of the right to the use of water."" As
discussed above, with the diverse water uses in New Mexico, it would not
only be politically, but also economically unwise to change this part of the
definition. For almost a century, New Mexico has been well served by an
expansive definition of beneficial use as the basis for a water right.' There

82.
83.
84.
85.

See id.
N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 3.
Id.
See id.
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are many "beneficial uses" that serve to diversify our culture and economy.
Of course, the initial determination of what "beneficial use" is has always
remained within the discretion of the OSE, " and because it is such a
factual matter determined by hydrologic, engineering, and legal considerations, the OSE is perhaps the proper entity for this determination.
Second, "beneficial use" as the "measure" of a water right should
also remain as a basic element of the essential water code.' Without having
some general measure of a water use, the legislature or the OSE would
have to somehow delineate specific measures of each possible proposed
water use. This alone would be a tremendous task.
The third concept in the definition of "beneficial use" is the
limitation aspect ("[b]eneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the
limit of the right").' A change in this part of the definition could help to
clarify the concept of conservation. The first two aspects of the definition
deal with a determination of why and in what quantity a person could use
water. But, the third part deals with how the appropriator would use a
water right. Although it includes much more, the principal aspect of
conservation is a mandate to existing appropriators to use the resource
more efficiently. Conservation goals can be achieved by precluding uses
that are inefficient.
The OSE could promulgate a regulation defining beneficial use:
"Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of the right to
the use of water, subject to reduction if the appropriator does not make
reasonably efficient use of the right." Efficient use of water should be
defined, in general, as a water use which minimizes the diversion and
consumption of water without adversely affecting the beneficial use
thereof, and is consistent with present technologies which are economically
feasible. In the interim period before a regulation is adopted, the OSE
should issue a policy statement with the same information.
Definition of Water Conservation
It appears that a definition of conservation could be adopted based
on existing constitutional definitions, statutes relating to the subject, and
case law. Statutory guidance comes from requirements that the state
engineer determine that new applications and transfers are not "contrary
to the conservation of water." 89 For new applications and adjudications, the
OSE has the authority to determine an amount of surface water "consistent

86.

See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-2-8; 72-4-15 (Michie Repl. Pamp. 1997).

87. See § 72-12-2.
88. N.M. CoNSr. art. XVI, § 3.
89. §§ 72-5-6; 72-5-7; 72-12-3(D) & (E). See also§ 72-5-5.1.
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with good agricultural practices and which will result in the most effective
use of available water in order to prevent waste."9' Other statutes recognize
the relationship between "conservation" and the "prevention of waste." 91
The ISC has a mandate to "protect" and "conserve" the waters of the
state.9Y
New Mexico administrative law supports the concept of "efficient"
water use, particularly in municipal use. The city of Roswell was denied a
request for additional water because it had a "high" per capita rate of water
use and had no conservation plan specifying measures to make consumption more efficient.' The Intel Corporation was required to reduce its water
demand by 40 percent through conservation in a recent OSE decision.94 The
city of El Paso, Texas, was denied a request for additional water, partly
because the state engineer decided that the city could meet 40-year needs
through conservation and more efficient use.9"
With these precedents, it is likely that the OSE could successfully
adopt a definition of water conservation with the concepts of efficient use
without unreasonable waste. Because, in general, there is no existing legal
impediment to such a definition, the state engineer could implement a
conservation policy either by practice, as has been the custom in the office,
or by formal regulation, which has rarely been resorted to. In light of the
need to raise public consciousness about conservation, a formal wellpublicized regulation would be preferable to the current case-by-case

approach.
Such a new regulation should dearly apply to new applications to
appropriate water. It should also apply to changes in the purpose and place
of use of existing rights. Finally, because the definition of beneficial use

could limit existing rights to the most efficient means of exercising them,
a conservation regulation could apply as well to existing rights to water so
long as those rights either had been adjudicated or were based on an OSE
license. 96

90. § 72-5-18.
91. See § 72-8-4.
92. See § 72-14-3.
93. See In re Application of Leo Edward Bergschneider for Permit to Change Point of
Diversion and Place and Purpose of Use from Surface to Ground Water in the RoswellArtesian Basin, New Mexico, New Mexico State Engineer Nos. 01734 & RA-4533-Enlgd. A&B
into RA-4253 & RA-4255, Findings of Fact & Recommendation 3-5 (1992).
94. See In re Application of INTEL Corp. to Appropriate the Underground Waters of the
State of New Mexico in the Rio Grande Underground Water Basin, New Mexico State
Engineer Nos. RG-57125; RG- 57125-S; RG-57125-S-2, Findings and Order 14-17 (1994).
95. See In re Applications of the City of El Paso, Texas, Public Service Board Nos. HU-12
through HU-71 &LRG-92 through LRG-357, New Mexico State Engineer Findings and Order

6-8 (1987).
96. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-2-9 (Michie Repl. Pamp. 1997).
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The OSE should adopt a regulation defining water conservation,
containing at least the following elements: (1) efficient use of water to
prevent or reduce waste without causing reductions in economic benefits,
without causing impairment to existing users, and without being detrimental to public welfare; (2) use which prevents or reduces water pollution; (3)
use with presently available and economically feasible technologies; (4)
reduced water uses, including diversions, conveyance losses, incidental
depletions and return flows.
As a program implementation measure, it is recommended that a
"conservation policy handbook" be prepared by the OSE, including the
following:
conservation definitions, including beneficial use;
guidelines for a conservation plan, including required contents of
an acceptable plan;
a review of OSE administrative decisions on conservation,
including El Paso, Roswell, Alamogordo and Intel;
information on available conservation grants and loans for
municipal, agricultural and industrial users;
return flow policies encouraging conservation;
water banking opportunities for conservation;
integrated resource planning, including water quality and
watershed management;
economic incentives for water conservation (including examples);
incentives and methods for selling conserved water;
methods for using a water right for instream flow; and
examples of variations in "consumptive irrigation requirement"
(CIR) from basin to basin, including the reasons for variations and
example calculations.
Grants and Loans
Some grant and loan options are presently available for agricultural water conservation through programs such as the Irrigation Works
Construction Fund and related state and federal programs9 " A description
of these opportunities should be published as a "guide to water conservation project funding" or included in a handbook, along with application.
Evaluation of the amounts funded each year in New Mexico should be
summarized and published.
Additional funding options through the Conservation Program of
the OSE should be actively pursued, and a "water conservation grants"
program should be established. Areas funded would include municipal,

97. See Fleming & Hall, supra note 18, at 27.
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agricultural, and industrial water conservation projects. Funding for such
a program could come from fees charged for water withdrawals. Although
the Irrigation Works Construction Fund has the option to fund more
agricultural water conservation projects, the opportunities need to be better
described and publicized.' The ISC should require each funded project to
document the amount of water conserved. Additional agricultural projects
should be funded under an OSE "water conservation grants program."
Return Flow Policies
Return flow policies allowing credits against diversion requirements are a disincentive to water reuse. Revisions in water rights return
flow policies would encourage reuse of effluent for groundwater recharge
and irrigation of lower quality water on parks and other outdoor facilities.
Return flow policies should (1) encourage reuse and groundwater
recharge, particularly in nonrenewable aquifers; (2) account for lower
quality water in return flows; (3) recognize that a water right includes a
diversion amount, farm delivery amount, a consumptive irrigation
requirement (CIR), a return flow amount and conveyance losses.
These initiatives should be effected through internal policy
development, rather than statutory or regulatory changes. Steps for
implementation include (1) establishment of a joint Water Rights Division/Special Projects/Hydrology Section task force to formulate preliminary technical recommendations, (2) request for public input on proposed
changes in water rights policies, (3) formulation of recommended policy
changes and submission to the state engineer, (4) revision and adoption of
policy changes by the state engineer, and (5) publication of return flow
policies in the "water conservation handbook."
Water Banking and Forfeiture Issues
Several recent provisions in the law, particularly the Pecos Basin
Water Conservation Program, provide mechanisms for conservation
districts and acequia associations to save water through conservation
practices and not lose the conserved water by forfeiture." Municipalities
already have these privileges under current law." Water banking vests
these administrative entities with the power to enact conservation
programs and retain the conserved water rights. It also vests the state
engineer with oversight power in approving conservation programs. With

98. See id.

99. See § 72-5-28(G).
100. See § 72-5-28(C).
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the broad powers to hold water rights and transfer them, conditions for
water banking approaches are greatly improved.
While this provision alleviates the concern about forfeiture,
circumventing the beneficial use and the four-year forfeiture requirements,
it only benefits the listed entities. It does not expressly authorize the state
engineer to enact conservation programs, although the ISC is empowered
to initiate banking.'' Acequia associations have not yet used this provision,
and a manual describing the steps in setting up a water bank for conserved
water would be a useful step in encouraging implementation of conservation opportunities.
The OSE should prepare a policy statement stating that, under
existing legislation,= banked or conserved depletions can be sold or leased
by acequia associations, conservation districts or municipalities. The
statement should also clarify that conserved or banked water could also be
allowed to become instream flow without fear of forfeiture. If the conservation practice is discontinued, the OSE can protect the integrity of the stream
system by requiring that the seller retain at least as large a water right (in
acre-feet) as the one sold or leased. The OSE would retain jurisdiction over
the seller's remaining water right, and would reduce it by the amount of
the conservation practice that was discontinued.
Coordination of Water Quality and Quantity
Several opportunities exist for conjunctive management of water
quality and quantity without statutory or regulatory changes. Policy
statements need to be prepared and publicized that recognize the conservation advantages of protecting water from quality degradation and the
potential for using and reusing poor quality water for various appropriate
uses.
An interagency task force should be established with representatives from the OSE; the ISC; the Energy, Minerals and Natural Resources
Department; and the Environment Department so that common conservation goals can be accomplished. Cooperative arrangements between the
OSE and the NM Environment Department should be encouraged so that
critical water quality issues, particularly in the areas of water reuse and the
allocation of lower quality water for certain uses, can be integrated into a
comprehensive conservation program. Within the Environment Department, the Water Quality Standards Program, the Nonpoint Source Control
Program, and the Surface Water Bureau are key elements. 1

101. See § 72-5-28(G).
102. See id.
103. See Fleming & Hall, supranote 18, at 63.
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A system of water credits for using poor quality water and other
reuse procedures needs to be established as part of OSE water rights policy.
An OSE task force comprised of representatives from the Water Rights
Division, the Hydrology Section, the Water Conservation Program, and the
Environmental Division should be established to formulate policies on this
issue. The task force should draft proposed policies to be reviewed and
approved by the state engineer as OSE policy. The task force could begin
with the goal of Arizona's Water Quality Assessment and Management
Program, which is "to manage the quality of.. .groundwater in order to
maximize the quantity of water available for beneficial use."1 °'
For example, Arizona accounts for effluent at a reduced rate for the
purposes of determining compliance with an annual pumping allotment.1'
If the amount of effluent used by a golf course is between 50 percent and
89 percent of its annual diversion allotment or actual use (whichever is
less), each acre-foot of effluent is counted as only 0.85 acre-foot of water for
diversion right accounting." If effluent use is 90 percent or more of use,
each acre-foot is counted as 0.80 acre-foot."°
Information on integrated water quality and quantity management
for conservation enhancement should be presented in an OSE "conservation handbook." The Environment Department should have a representative on the Interstate Stream Commission. While the OSE/ISC has a
representative on the Water Quality Control Commission, the Environment
Department is not represented on the Interstate Stream Commission."~
User Charges and Metering
Other states, such as Arizona, charge water users a fee for
withdrawals based on the quantity withdrawn (an incentive to conserve
water)."° The Arizona fees, ranging up to $5 per acre-foot of water
withdrawn, are used to pay part of the costs of administering water and to
fund a grant program of conservation projects."1
Through regulation, a system of withdrawal fees should be
adopted for New Mexico to pay for administering the water conservation
program, as well as for funding a program of water conservation grants.
The fee schedule should be established on a "per acre-foot" of withdrawal

104. See ARIZONA DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR THE SECOND
MANAGEMENT PERIOD: PHO nx AcTrvE MANAGEMENT AREA 43 (1991).

105. See id. at 184.
106.

See id.

107.

See id.
See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-28(G) (Michie Repl. Pamp. 1997).
See ARIZONA DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, supra104, at 274.

108.
109.
110.

See id.

Winter 20001

WATER CONSERVATION INCENTIVES

basis, in itself an incentive for water conservation. It is recommended that
a task force within the OSE/ISC be established to develop a program of
withdrawal fees, based upon the amount of water used, and recommend
a program to the state engineer for approval.
It is clear that metering is an incentive to conserve water, especially
when rate structures are of the increasing block-rate type.' Just as
important is the information that comes from metering of water use in
various basins. Senior personnel in the OSE and ISC consider the information critical for making rational water administration decisions."'
Mandatory metering of all water use is recommended policy for
the OSE because the information is considered essential for rational
administration and evaluation of all programs related to water use,
including water conservation. This policy should be adopted as soon as
administratively possible and implemented on a basin-by-basin priority,
beginning with the basins having the highest water use and most serious
supply/demand problems.
Economic Analysis
The use of benefit-cost analysis is an effective way of demonstrating economic incentives for conservation." 3 Some benefits are "hidden"
and need to be dearly quantified and shown to decision makers who may
be uncertain about the economic viability of water conservation. The OSE
should consider establishing a position in economic analysis or contracting
for the studies. Examples of the economic benefits of water conservation
should be illustrated in an OSE "water conservation handbook."
The importance of evaluating economic tradeoffs has been
mentioned several times in this analysis: return flow policies, water
banking, water quality issues, user charges, and public welfare evaluations
(particularly with regard to the entitlement to conserved water). Several
states, particularly California, use benefit-cost analysis as a method to
determine the economic efficiency of various water conservation
programs." 4
Comparing the benefits and costs of a particular conservation
measure is a useful exercise because it can be an important way to convince
decision makers to adopt a program. A recent water conservation

111.
112.

See Fleming & Hall, supra note 18,at 65.
See id.

113. See William 1. Fleming, Phewa Tat Catchment Management Program:Benefits and Costs
of Watershed Conservation in Nepal, in FOREST AND WATERSHED DEVELOPMENT AND
CONSERVATION IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 217,265 (Lawrence S. Hamilton ed., 1983).
114. See GARY S. FISK & RENNIE ANN WEINER, A GUIDE TO CuSTOMER INCENTIVES FOR
WATER CONSERVATION 16 (U.S.Envtl. Protection Agency Handbook No. 230-R-94-001,1994).
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conference illustrated the method with an example from Austin, Texas,
where the benefits and costs of installing ultra low flush toilets were
analyzed from the perspective of the customer."' Results showed that the
customers would save $1.06 million by lowering water consumption
during the first year, compared with installation costs of $0.9 million."6
Economic analysis of the costs and benefits of, for example, effluent
reuse could be done for the city of Albuquerque. Costs would include the
purchase of additional rights for effluent water not returned to the river
and distribution costs of transporting effluent to parks, golf courses, and
other irrigation opportunities. Benefits would include savings from lower
water supply treatment costs, possible groundwater recharge, and more
available water for other uses. The benefits of using lower quality water for
certain uses could be evaluated in a similar way.
Examples of the economic benefits of water conservation, such as
those summarized here, should be presented in a "water conservation
handbook." Case studies from other communities should be described,
illustrating the benefits of using lower quality water for a variety of uses,
benefits of instream flow for fish and recreation uses, and the benefits and
costs of a program to install ultra low flush toilets.
Integrated Resource Management for Water Conservation
Integrating key elements of the planning process will help to
ensure that a community water conservation plan has a good chance for
successful implementation. The first step of the process involves a careful
and insightful definition of plan objectives, such as the use of the most
technically efficient and/or cost-effective measures to reduce water use.
Continuous monitoring and evaluation are needed so the success of the
plan can be documented and demonstrated. Both supply-side and demandside options for efficient water use should be evaluated and rated in terms
of the carefully outlined objectives.
Local public input is essential from the beginning of the planning
process because it is the people who live in the region who are the
implementers of the plan. Locals must feel they have helped to identify
problems and solutions, and will be involved in continuous evaluation of
project success. Public meetings may have to be professionally facilitated
for maximum effectiveness. Financial and economic analyses are essential
to ensure that benefits are expected to exceed costs, with inclusion of non-

115. See Ximena Poch, Austin's Free Toilet Program:Cheaperthan Rebates!, in PROCEEDINGS
OF CONSERV %: RESPONSIBLE WATER STEWARDSHIP 649,652 (1996).
116. See id. at 652-53.
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monetary values in the equation. The benefits of education and demonstration components should not be underestimated.
All water right applicants should be required to prepare a
conservation plan and the OSE should prepare and publish a "New Mexico
Conservation Plan Handbook." The OSE needs to develop a methodology
to ensure that applicants plan and implement conservation measures. A
conservation plan needs to include a detailed evaluation of supply and
demand, evaluation of methods to reduce demand through increased
efficiency, evaluation of alternative sources of supply, economic analysis
of the costs of alternative sources, consideration of the most technically
efficient water conservation methods to reduce demand, impacts on other
users, whether the source is renewable or nonrenewable, how long a
nonrenewable source will last, water quality issues of reuse and the use of
lower quality water, and the disposition of conserved water. Guidelines
should be developed for staff review of conservation plans.
The OSE should recognize in a policy statement that integrated
resource management plans for watersheds are a rational basis for
statewide water planning. Watershed management involves the analysis,
protection, development, and maintenance of the land, vegetation, and
water resources of a drainage basin for the conservation of all its resources
and for the benefit of its residents."1 Watershed management is directly
related to water conservation because it reduces flood peaks, prolongs
streamflow during dry seasons, and reduces the sedimentation rate in
reservoirs."' Watershed management incorporates all aspects of water
supply management, habitat protection, flood control, and water quality
protection efforts.119 The watershed approach provides a framework and
a new focus for effectively integrating ongoing programs and developing
innovative solutions to water management problems.
Disposition of Conserved Water
At present New Mexico captures (and thereby "conserves")
incidental depletions required by beneficial use only when an existing right
is transferred to a new place for a new use."' For more than twenty-five
years, the OSE has administratively limited transfers to specific

consumptions for particular uses. At the time of the transfer, the balance of
a New Mexico water right included in a diversion-incidental off-farm and

117. See generlly Bill Fleming. Watershed Health: An Evaluation Index for New Mexico
(1998) (unpublished manuscript, on fie with the author).
118. See id. at 8.
119. See id.
120. See Fleming & Hall, supranote 18, at 68.
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on-farm depletions not recaptured as part of the historic supply of existing
users-is returned to the public stock to satisfy other existing users with
histories of a short supply, and then new appropriations. New Mexico
could impose or encourage the same "conservation" methods, prior to
transfer, by requiring the holders of existing rights to reduce those
incidental depletions currently needed to serve the underlying beneficial
use essential to the right, if economically feasible.
New Mexico could achieve those conservation savings with respect
to existing rights in one of two ways. First, the OSE, by regulation, could
require the holders of existing rights either to reduce their incidental
depletions or to reduce their corresponding consumptive right ("direct
depletion"). In this way, existing holders would have to elect either to
conserve water by correcting for their own incidental depletions or by
cutting back on their direct depletion. If an existing water rights holder
chose not to reduce his incidental depletions, he would be required to
reduce his direct depletion. One way or the other, the same amount of
public water would be conserved.
An example clarifies this alternative: a farmer has a diversion right
of eight acre-feet per acre (afpa). One acre-foot of that diversion is depleted
by the farmer's delivery system before the water reaches the point of direct
depletion for beneficial use. The consumptive irrigation requirement by the
crop amounts to three acre-feet. Another acre-foot is depleted after the
water passes the point of direct consumption. The last three acre-feet of the
diversion are neither directly consumed nor indirectly depleted. This
amount is incidentally lost and recovered by other existing users as part of
their historic water supply.
In the above scenario, the OSE could require the existing water
right holder to bring his diversion closer to his direct consumption by
requiring him to reduce the two acre-feet part of his eight acre-feet
diversion attributable to incidental depletions. The OSE probably could not
require the water right holder to reduce the three acre-feet part of his
diversion right attributable to direct consumption for beneficial use since
these three acre-feet are the essential part of his protected property right.
But the OSE could require the appropriator to reduce his diversion by a
reasonable fraction of the two acre-feet of his eight acre-feet diversion
which represents incidental depletions not strictly necessary to his
consumptive right and not part of a neighbor's historic supply.
A second alternative could be used if the water rights holder
refused to invest in the technologies necessary to reduce incidental
depletions. The OSE could reduce a water right owner's direct consumption for beneficial use to offset the unnecessary incidental depletions. In the
scenario above, the OSE would require the water rights holder to reduce
his direct consumptive depletion by two acre-feet, the amount of the user's
incidental depletions, thus requiring the inefficient user to account for his
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incidental depletions as if they were part of his consumptive right. Either
by reduction in diversion or reduction in direct depletion, the OSE would
make additional unappropriated water available for public purposes.
The OSE might also consider splitting water saved by reduction of
incidental depletions between the water right conservator and the state.
Referring to the example above, if the irrigator eliminated the two acre-feet
of his own incidental depletions, the OSE could allow him to increase his
direct consumption by one acre-foot. The other acre-foot would revert to
the public supply.
The first, a regulatory alternative, may seem harsh, especially in
light of the long-standing practice in New Mexico of not scrutinizing too
critically the ancient and on-going inefficient methods of delivering water
to the land. Nevertheless, such regulation is dearly allowed by New
Mexico law.121 For New Mexico, it is a question of political will rather than
legal right.
The second, a private investment alternative, has the advantage of
appearing less Draconian, although it offers less in savings to the public.
Oregon, with its much less rigorous analysis of the elements of a water
right, has attracted very few takers for its water conservation scheme."2
The experience there suggests that the offer of a private/public conservation plan may not hold much promise.
In any case, no one knows how much water is now incidentally
depleted from New Mexico's public supply. The two alternatives discussed
here-regulation and reduction-would require complex criteria to
administer and implement. A prudent first step would be to analyze the
potential amount of water that might be saved to determine whether either
is worthwhile.
The OSE should analyze the potential amount of water that might
be saved through the alternatives of regulation or reduction of existing
agricultural water rights. If one of the alternatives appears worthwhile and
administratively feasible, criteria for implementation should be developed
with public input.

121. See N.M CoNsT. art. XVI, § 3. See, e.g., New Mexico ex rel. Reynolds v. Lewis, 508 P.2d
577 (1973); New Mexico ex rel. Reynolds v. Niccum, 695 P.2d 489 (1985).
122. Telephone Interview with Douglas Parrow, Water Resources Specialist, Oregon Dep't
of Water Resources (Nov. 29,1995).

